“This is an existential challenge for Europe,” Kumar asserted, emphasising that the EU has long relied on American military backing, Russian energy, and Chinese markets—three pillars that have now become sources of instability. “The American security guarantee is in doubt, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has disrupted energy security, and China’s economic slowdown is limiting Europe’s export potential. It’s a real triple whammy,” he said in an interview with CNBC-TV18.
The landmark defence package, endorsed by 27 EU leaders—excluding Hungary—signals a shift in the bloc’s strategic posture, but key questions remain. Will member states be able to mobilise the necessary funds? How quickly can the plan be implemented? Kumar pointed out that discussions are underway on whether frozen Russian assets—estimated at $200 billion—could be tapped to support defence spending.Kumar was unequivocal in his assessment that the old liberal international order is dead. “The question is not whether we move to a multipolar world, but what kind of multipolarity will emerge,” he said. He outlined two possible scenarios: a structured balance of power with clear rules of engagement, or a chaotic contest between major and middle powers.
He suggested that US President Donald Trump’s worldview leans toward spheres of influence, where the US dominates the Western hemisphere while Russia and China carve out their own regional control. If this “trifurcation” of global power materialises, Europe’s ability to secure a significant role in this new world order remains uncertain.
“The trust in the transatlantic relationship has been broken,” Kumar noted, warning that even if a different US administration comes to power, restoring that trust will take time. The EU’s decision to ramp up defence spending is, in part, an acknowledgment that Europe must now secure its own future, he added.
Below is the verbatim transcript of the interview.
Q: In an emergency summit held in Brussels, 27 leaders agreed to boost EU defence spending. Do you think all the member states will eventually be able to agree on this? As of now, theoretically, they have endorsed it.Kumar: That is the million-dollar question because it’s one thing for the Commission to decide on paper—this is more of virtue signalling, if you like, because this is a moment of reckoning for the European Union. They have been very badly sidelined in the conflict in Ukraine. Conversations and negotiations are going to happen in Jeddah next week between Russia, Ukraine and the US. Europe is nowhere on the agenda. In light of this, Europe and the European Commission in particular have to be seen to be doing something. They’ve gone ahead and agreed on this ambitious package, with the possible exception of Hungary, which stayed out. The question really now is, how soon can this be put into practice? Will member states be able to come up with the funds? There is also some talk of how to unfreeze the amount of Russian money that’s been frozen—an amount of $200 billion has been frozen of Russian assets in Europe alone, and there is some talk of using that interest, which has already been done, but can you unfreeze this amount as well? Europe will do everything to come up with the goods because this is an existential challenge.
The bottom line is the European Union has, for the last 80 years, been used to American security guarantees; they are used to cheap energy from Russia; and they have access to the unlimited Chinese market for goods and services. Suddenly, all three have turned out to be problems for the EU: the American security guarantee is in doubt, Russia invaded Ukraine, so Russian energy is a problem because of sanctions, and the Chinese slowdown in the market means that Europe cannot export as much to China as before. It’s a real triple whammy that the European Union is facing. It couldn’t have come at a worse moment. They’re doing everything in their power to know that this has to be done.
What is more significant is that the trust in the transatlantic relationship has been broken, and I’m not sure it can be restored anytime soon.
Q: Are we going to see a very different global order in the next five to 10 years?
Kumar: Without a doubt. The old liberal international order is dead and there is no way you can revive it. What is not clear is that we will eventually move to a multipolar world order. The question is, what kind of multipolar world order? Will there be rules of the game? How many poles will you have? Who will occupy those poles? After all, the European Union was expected to occupy a pole, but will they be able to do it? Those are the questions. In the near term, you will find that it is going to be very messy. I suspect Trump’s own thinking leans towards spheres of influence. IHe wants the US to dominate the Western hemisphere, which is why he’s doing what he’s doing in Panama, which is why he’s trying to do something with Canada and Mexico and so on. He will, of course, also have an interest in the Western Pacific. Russia will have at least a limited sphere of influence in Europe. And the million-dollar question, which has a lot of implications for India, is whether China will get its sphere of influence in East Asia. If this trifurcation of the world happens, and it’s hypothetical, if this happens, then we are looking at some balance of power, which may, as you say, in five years, 10 years take place and the world may see some stability. But if not, I think we are going to see a situation where you have the US, China, Russia, three powers—but then you have a bunch of middle powers, which will try to jostle for space, which will try to be swing states and it becomes messy and difficult to predict.
Q: There have been tense exchanges between Ukraine and the US at the White House, particularly between President Zelenskyy and President Trump, with a sense that relations were deteriorating. However, it now seems that the UK, the European Union, and other global players are returning to the table, acknowledging the need to find a path to peace. Do you sense that things are moving in the direction of ending the war? With the European Union realising that the US may not continue to bear the cost of this war indefinitely—especially as it has already suspended aid—do you think that, to protect their economies, they too will recognise the need to end the conflict?
Kumar: You are spot on. I don’t think the US is going to continue to underwrite this war anymore. Europeans know that as well. I see a two-stage process that the Americans will now negotiate in Jeddah between the Russian delegation and the Ukrainian delegation. The first part of this two-step process will be to get a kind of ceasefire, which will at least apply to air, to the seas, and to the prevention of Russian attacks on energy infrastructure in Ukraine. The land ceasefire is going to be problematic. That will probably take a little bit of time.
The more important question is, you cannot see the ceasefire holding without two things. One, you need some peacekeepers on the ground, and European countries like France, but also the UK, which is not part of the EU, but is still European. Both countries have said they will put peacekeepers on the ground in Ukraine to guard the peace. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has categorically rejected this and said they will not accept peacekeepers. That part of the deal is yet to be negotiated.
Meanwhile, there is a discussion of nuclear deterrence in Europe. Germany says to France, I think we would like your nuclear deterrence to be extended to us. That completely changes the equilibrium in France, in Europe, and in Russia. Predictably, the Russians have said, this is an important threat for us if the nuclear deterrence of France is made available to allies in Europe. All in all, you are seeing Europe in flux. You are seeing a Europe that has been completely unloaded into uncertainty because of the Trump administration, and you’re seeing a Europe that’s pretty much on its own.
