“The wars of the next century will be fought over water” — Ismail Serageldin, Vice President, World Bank (1995).
In today’s context, let us look at Pakistan, a country in continuous conflict with India. The Indus River and its key tributaries dominate Pakistan’s river system. The five traditionally recognised eastern tributaries are the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej — all originating in India. The Kabul River, another significant western tributary, contributes around 12% of the Indus’s flow and originates in Afghanistan.
Collectively, these transboundary rivers contribute over 75% of Pakistan’s surface water, making the country heavily dependent on upstream flows — a critical vulnerability for the world’s fifth most populous country. Per a 2022 report by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), over three-fourths of Pakistan’s water originates outside its borders.
Are we back in a geography class? No. This bit of topographical recall is important — especially for Pakistan — since India, on April 23, 2025, suspended key provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960, following the terror attack in Jammu and Kashmir’s Pahalgam on April 22, which left 26 people dead.Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made it amply clear that “blood and water” cannot flow together, reiterating his stance in Rajasthan on May 22, saying: “If Pakistan continues to export terrorists… it will have to struggle for every penny. Pakistan will not get India’s rightful share of water…”
Afghanistan in the mix
Pakistan is still left with the Kabul River originating in Afghanistan. But here is the problem. Unconfirmed reports suggest the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan may be planning to construct dams on the Kunar River — a tributary of the Kabul River that flows into Pakistan and joins the Indus — raising fresh concerns over water security.There is no formal water-sharing treaty between Pakistan and Afghanistan — something Pakistan has sought for years, as reported by Dawn. Unilateral construction by Afghanistan could threaten downstream agriculture in Pakistan. According to Dawnthe Kabul River accounts for around 17% of Pakistan’s water supply during the winter months, when the Indus flows decline.
In a significant shift in India’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar held a phone conversation with Taliban-appointed Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi on May 15 — the first such engagement since the Taliban seized power in 2021. This signals that India is recalibrating its regional diplomacy, while also reinforcing its zero-tolerance stance on terrorism and Pakistan’s alleged role in fostering it.
Discussions reportedly included the advancement of the Shahtoot Dam project on the Kabul River — a proposal initiated during Ashraf Ghani’s presidency. The dam, to be funded by India at an estimated cost of over ₹2,000 crore (approximately $270 million), aims to provide drinking water to around two million residents of Kabul and support irrigation across 4,000 hectares.
India previously constructed the Salma Dam (officially the Afghan-India Friendship Dam), inaugurated in 2016 in Herat province.
Meanwhile, within India, ongoing hydroelectric projects like Kishanganga and Ratle — developed under the Indus Waters Treaty — have raised objections in Pakistan. Islamabad claims these projects reduce downstream water availability at certain times, though India insists they comply with treaty terms.
Pakistan’s water problems
Pakistan’s water crisis is worsening due to its heavy reliance on the Indus River system, which supplies 90–95% of its freshwater. Contributing factors include inefficient water use, rapid population growth, urban expansion, climate change, and excessive groundwater extraction.
According to the PIDE report, over 60% of irrigation, 70% of drinking water, and nearly all industrial water needs depend on the Indus Basin aquifer.
Although Pakistan adopted its first National Water Policy in 2018, recognising water as a finite resource, implementation has been weak. Some provinces — such as Punjab (2019), Balochistan, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa — have passed their own water policies, but the lack of reliable data, clear goals, political will, and neglect of water quality issues has hindered meaningful progress, according to the PIDE report mentioned above.
Major cities like Karachi, Rawalpindi, and Islamabad are facing acute shortages. In April 2025, Dawn reported that half of Karachi’s population — especially in informal settlements — lacks adequate access to clean water.
In Rawalpindi, insufficient rainfall and falling water levels at Khanpur Dam prompted strict restrictions by the Water and Sanitation Agency (WASA), with warnings that supplies may last only a month. On May 7, Dawn reported that Rawalpindi and Islamabad are on the brink of a water crisis, with Khanpur’s reserves expected to last just 35 days — triggering fears of irrigation cuts and limited drinking water availability.
Pakistan’s economy — with 23% from agriculture and 20% from industry — is highly vulnerable to water shocks. While it recorded 2.68% growth in FY25, the country remains reliant on external support, including a $2.4 billion IMF bailout linked to 11 reform conditions.
Amid this crisis, India’s tougher stance on terrorism and increasing global clout may further isolate Pakistan, especially as New Delhi reconsiders the IWT and deepens its regional partnerships.
India, Pakistan, and the IWT of 1960
The Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960 after nine years of World Bank-mediated negotiations, has long been viewed as a rare model of sustained India-Pakistan cooperation — surviving even wars in 1965, 1971, and 1999.
It allocated the three eastern rivers — Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej — to India, and the three western rivers — Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab — to Pakistan, with provisions allowing India limited use of the western rivers for hydropower and irrigation.
After the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack, India suspended its IWT obligations the following day, invoking Article XII(3) to cite “fundamental changes”, including Pakistan’s alleged inaction on terrorism, demographic shifts, and growing water needs.
Pakistan warned of international escalation. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s National Security Committee declared: “Any attempt to stop or divert the flow of water belonging to Pakistan as per the Indus Waters Treaty and the usurpation of the rights of lower riparians will be considered an act of war.”
India had earlier sought treaty modifications, citing climate change and rising water demand. In 2013, a Court of Arbitration upheld Pakistan’s claims over Kishanganga Dam flows. Post-2016 Uri attack, India began linking water to security, suspended Indus Commission meetings, and vowed to maximise its water usage. After the 2019 Pulwama attack, it reaffirmed its right to fully utilise the eastern rivers.
In 2022, the World Bank appointed experts to mediate dam disputes. India formally requested IWT modifications in 2023 and escalated its demands in 2024, calling the treaty outdated. Pakistan rejected these efforts, and no consensus was reached.
Will China come to aid?
During a recent meeting in Beijing, Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and Chinese counterpart Wang Yi reaffirmed their nations’ strategic ties. China, through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), has invested heavily in Pakistan’s infrastructure.
With Taliban Foreign Minister Muttaqi also present and China announcing plans to extend CPEC into Afghanistan, these developments could pose fresh diplomatic challenges for India.
While Chinese investments bring much-needed capital to cash-strapped nations, they risk long-term debt dependency, potentially expanding China’s regional influence at India’s expense.
Though Pakistan will likely try to escalate the India–Pakistan conflict on the global stage, it is unlikely to go to war over water — after all, how can one fight when lacking even the basic necessities of food and water to survive?
