New Delhi’s actions were “focused, measured and non-escalatory” to avoid military targets and population centres. However, in response, Pakistan stepped up the aggression by targeting civilian areas and military infrastructure across Northern and Western India, bordering the International Boundary and Line of Control. India retaliated by targeting air defence systems in several Pakistani cities, including Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi.
An enraged Pakistan then escalated its campaign by launching armed drones and high-speed missiles (reportedly Fatah 1) towards India. This compelled New Delhi to launch a series of missile attacks on May 10 at the 11 key airbases of the Pakistan Air Force, including the Nur Khan airbase in Rawalpindi. The impact of these strikes was devastating, as shown by the tri-services briefing on May 11. Several media reports noted that Pakistan had reportedly convened (and later cancelled) a meeting of the National Command Authority (NCA), which oversees its nuclear arsenal. This move was reminiscent of 2019, when Pakistan had called for the NCA meeting after India bombed the JeM training camps in Balakot. This brought Washington into the picture, which had remained at arm’s length from the conflict until then.
For the Trump administration, the spiralling conflict between India and Pakistan and the latter’s dangling of the nuclear threat provided an opportunity to intervene. After setbacks in achieving the Ukraine-Russia ceasefire, Iran nuclear talks, and the Israel-Palestine peace process, the administration officials had been scouting for some gains on the foreign policy front for President Donald Trump. Initially, Washington had been in hands-off mode from the India-Pakistan hostilities, symbolised by comments of Vice President JD Vance, who had termed it as “none of our business.”
However, as the situation worsened and administration officials received “alarming intelligence” of potentially catastrophic escalation, Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio stepped in, reaching out to the Indian and Pakistani leaders. It appears that Pakistan, too, had dialled for the US for intervention to prevent further Indian strikes. There was a belief that India was preparing to decapacitate Pakistan’s strategic offensive capabilities and nuclear command infrastructure. Behind the scenes, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, too, may have played a role. Riyadh sent its Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Adel Al-Jubeir, to New Delhi and Islamabad last week to diffuse tensions. Additionally, its foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan bin Abdullah, spoke to both leaders from both countries. As key partners of India in the Middle East, and those with some leverage over Pakistan, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi would have been willing to press for de-escalation to avoid wider conflagration, which would also affect their interests. Pakistan has claimed that “three dozen” countries helped facilitate the agreement with India.
However, the China factor will be the most interesting to watch. Over the years, Chinese defence hardware has played a key role in strengthening Pakistani military capabilities. Pakistan even deployed it against India, including the JF-17 fighter jets, PL-15 missiles and HQ-9 missile defence system. Even as Beijing would have been happier to see India getting distracted by the conflict with Pakistan, it is also in Beijing’s interest not to allow its key ally to degrade militarily by the Indian strikes. Moreover, the less-than-satisfactory performance of the Chinese hardware in defending Pakistani airspace and key military infrastructure would have also embarrassed it. Therefore, China may have leaned on the Pakistan military to press for a ceasefire.
The ceasefire, however, only marks the end of military hostilities between the two countries. It is the beginning of a long game with Pakistan. Having paused militarily, India would be keen to intensify its non-kinetic punitive actions against Islamabad. The Indus Water Treaty remains in abeyance, and New Delhi would be resolute in controlling the flow of rivers to Pakistan. Diplomatically, India has already stated that it plans to take up Pakistan’s support for anti-India terrorist groups at next week’s United Nations Security Council’s 1267 sanctions committee meeting. The widely circulated photo of the funeral of the killed LeT operatives in Muridke, attended by LeT commander Abdul Rauf and several Pakistan Army officials, will be a key piece of evidence in India’s arsenal.
Pakistan may have scored a temporary reprieve from India and even tout it as a ‘victory’. However, New Delhi will ensure that Islamabad and Rawalpindi are not allowed to recover or reassert themselves.
—The author, Sameer Patil, is Director, Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology, Observer Research Foundation (ORF). The views are personal.
